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RECENT CASES 289
facts charged were sufficient to constitute the offense or not,1 9 lends great
weight to the contention that there was no adequate state remedy for the
petitioner to fall back on.
It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court has always accorded the
rights guaranteed by the first Ten Amendments, especially those of freedom of
speech, press and religion, a preferred constitutional position.-' This, taken
in conjunction with the facts outlined above and the precedents of liberaliza-
tion of procedural requirements in such cases,2 1 would lead to the position
that the court ought to have heard the case on the merits or remanded it
to the Appellate Department for a clarification of the basis of its action.
The interests of preserving a preferred position for the basic civil rights while
still maintaining a reasonably orderly procedure would best be served by the
latter course of action. W. JAMES LIEBELER
HIGHWAYS - TITLE TO FEE AND RIGHTS OF ABUTTING OWNERS - RIGHTS
AS TO SOIL, TREES, GRASS, MINERALS AND OTHER MATERIALS WITHIN
HIGHWAYS. - Plaintiff was the owner of a tract of land lying on both sides
of a section line. Under the authority of state law, a highway had been built
on the section line. Plaintiff posted the land against hunting on both sides
of the highway. He sued for an injunction restraining the defendant from
hunting game on the highway and right of way. Affirming a decision of the
trial court, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the defendant was
not entitled to hunt wild game along the highway because the plaintiff owned
the fee to the land upon which the highway was located, subject only to the
right of the public to use the road for highway and travel purposes. Rutten v.
Wood, 57 N.W.2d 112 (N.D. 1953).
While the case is of interest to sportsmen, its true significance is found in
the light it casts upon the rights of abutting landowners to drill, explore, lease
and remove minerals from land underlying a highway. The decision of the
court clearly indicates that the only interest possessed by the public is an
easement of way upon the highway, the landowner retaining the soil, springs,
mines, quarries, timber and the like, although there appears to be a right in
the public officials to use suitable materials for improving or repairing the
road.1 The owner of real property abutting a street is presumed to own to the
center of the street. 2 A transfer of land conveys the soil to the center of the
highway, if nothing contrary appears from the grant.
3
19. Ex Parte Cutler, 1 Cal. App.2d 238, 36 P.2d 441 (1934); Ex Parte Ruef, 150
Cal. 666, 89 Pac. 605 (1907).
20. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
(1939); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); 33 Minn. L. Rev. 390 (1949); 48
Col. L. Rev. 427 (1948).
21. In Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) a conviction of breach of the
peace was reversed on the basis of a charge given in the trial court to which no objection
had been taken and which had gone unnoticed and unargued through the entire pro-
ceedings in the Illinois Appellate courts, being ferreted out only by the independent re-
search of the supreme court justices; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); 59
Yale L.J. 971 (1950).
1. Byron K. and William F. Elliott, Roads and Streets §499 (1926).
2. N.D. Rev. Code §47-0116 (1943); "An owner of land bounded by a road or
street is presumed to own to the center of the way, but the contrary may he shown."
3. N.D. Rev. Code §47-1010 (1943). "A transfer of land bounded by a highway
passes the title to the person whose estate is transferred to the soil of the highway in
front to the center thereof unless a different intent appears from the grant."
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The statutes of North Dakota provide that property may be taken under
the power of eminent domain for highway purposes. 4 Under one section of
the code, the exercise of the power of eminent domain gives an estate in fee
simple to the public when property is taken for "public buildings or grounds,
or for permanent buildings, for reservoirs and dams and permanent flooding
occasioned thereby, or for an outlet for a flow or a place for the deposit of
debris or tailings of a mine"; but the interest taken by the state when prop-
erty is appropriated for "any other use" is simply an easement.
5 
However,
other code provisions in the past have been held to vest a fee simple estate
in the state when land is condemned for highway purposes by the State High-
way Commission. 6 This last ruling was the subject of legislation in the 1953
Legislative Assembly, which passed a bill declaring the intent of the legis-
lature to have been that only an easement and not a fee simple was to have
been acquired by proceedings under the under the section in question and
re-conveying any greater interest than an easement.
7 
Unquestionably litiga-
tion will be necessary to determine the effectiveness of this action, inasmuch
as §185 of the Constitution of North Dakota forbids the making of donations
by the state to any individual, corporation or association, and in the event a
4. N.D. Rev. Code §32-1502 (1943). "Purposes for which eminent domain :nay
be exercised. . . . roads, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes and dumping places for working
mines, outlets, natural or otherwise, for the flow, deposit, or conduct of the tailings or
refuse from mines and mill dams."
5. N.D. Rev. Code §32-1503 (1943). "The following is a classification of the
estates and rights in lands subject to be taken for public use: 1. A fee simple, when
taken for public buildings or grounds, or by permanent buildings, for reservoirs and dams
and permanent flooding occasioned thereby, or for an outlet for a flow or a place for the
deposit of debris or tailings of a mine; 2. An easement, when taken for any other use;
3. The right of entry upon and occupation of lands and the right to take therefrom such
earth, gravel, stones, trees, and timber as may he necessary for a public use."
6. State Highway Commission v. State of North Dakota, 70 N.D. 673, 297 N.W.
194 (1941) (title to lands and materials acquired for highway purposes shall be in fee
simple, and not the mere acquisition of an easement). The statute relied upon was N.D.
Rev. Code §24-0117 (1943): "The state highway commissioner, by order, on behalf
of the state, and as part of the cost of constructing, reconstructing, widening, altering,
changing, locating, relocating, aligning, realigning, or maintaining a state highway, or of
providing for a temporary road for the public use, may purchase, acquire, take over, or
condemn under the right and power of eminent domain, for the state, any and all lands
which he shall deem necessary for present public use, either temporary or permannt, or
which he may deem necessary for reasonable future use, and to provide adequite drainage
in the improvement, construction, reconstruction, widening, altering, changing, locating,
relocating, aligning, realigning, or maintaining of a state highway. By the same means,
he may secure any and all materials, including clay, gravel, sand, or rock, or the lands
necessary to secure such materials, and the necessary land, or easements thereover, to
provide ways and access thereto. He maay acquire such land or materials notwithstanding
that the title thereto may be vested in the state or any division thereof."7. N.D. Sess. L. 1953, c.212. "Section 1. Declaration of Legislative Intent. It is
hereby declared to be the intent of the legislative assembly that section 32-1503 of the
North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 limits the estate that may be taken or acquired by
the state of North Dakota or its political subdivisions for highway purposes to that of an
easement. It is further found and declared that in granting conveyances to property for
highway purposes it was intended by all parties that only an easement was granted and
that the taking or acquiring of an estate greater than an easement for these purposes
is without authority, contrary to the intent of section 32-1503 and is null and void.
Section 2. Termination of Estates Greater Than An Easement. No Transfer to
the state of North Dakota or any of its political subdivisions of property for highway
purposes shall be deemed to include any interest greater than an easement, and where
any greater estate shall have been so transferred, the same is hereby reconveyed to the
owner from which such land was originally taken, or to the heirs, executors, administrators
or assigns of such owner. Such reconveyance shall be subject to any existing contracts or
agreements covering such property, and all rights and benefits thereof shall accrue to
the grantee."
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fee simple title to highway lands has been acquired by the state it would
seem difficult to escape the conclusion that retroactively transforming the state's
interests into an easement amounts to a donation of property to the abutting
landowners along the highway. No such difficulty is present in the case of
county highways, since the counties in exercising the power of eminent do-
main have not been permitted to take a fee.8
It is a well established rule that where an abutting owner owns the fee
simple title to land along which a street or highway runs, he is entitled to
eject a person who builds a structure on the street on the theory that he may
exercise powers of ownership not inconsistent with the easement. 9 In a North
Dakota decision, it has been held that where a street had been dedicated to
public use and a telephone company was granted a franchise by the city and
erected telephone poles on the street in front of the abutting owner's premises,
the abutting owner could enjoin the erection of the poles as inconsistent
with the use of the street for purposes of travel. 1O Similarly, it has been held
that the construction of a public water main under a county highway for the
purpose of supplying water to private, domestic and industrial uses constituted
the imposition of an additional burden upon the owner of the fee, entitling
him to compensation." And it has been held that digging a well in the street
to supply water to the public without compensation to the abutting owner
was an unlawful taking.12
Where an adjoining landowner and owner of the fee beneath the highway
leased the highway for the purpose of drilling for oil and gas, it was held
that the lease did not authorize the lessee to drill on the highway as ".he
drilling would involve maintenance of a nuisance and obstruction on the
highway.13 Where a landowner removed coal from underneath a highway,
causing a cave-in, the court similarly declared such activities a nuisance-
although it indicated that minerals may be removed where they do not cause
a subsidence of the land. 14 An abutting landowner has been permitted to
remove gravel within the limits of a highway right of way, where the removal
did not cause injury to the roadway and the gravel was not needed for the
road, on the principle that the abutting owner may remove deposits of min-
erals within the limits of the highway as long as such removal is not incon-
sistent with the full enjoyment of the public easement. 15 Since the develop-
ment of modern techniques in drilling for oil and gas deposits had been such
that it is possible to drill a curved hole under land on which it is impossible
8. Sheridan County v. Davis, 61 N.D. 744, 240 N.W. 867 (1932).
9. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Lake, 10 N.D. 541, 88 N.W. 461 (1901).
10. Donavon v. Allert, 11 N.D. 289, 91 N.W. 441 (1902).
11. Hofius v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation, 146 Ohio St. 574, 67 N.E.2d 429
(1946); Gran Construction Co. v. Minneapolis, St. Paul. & S.S.M. By., 36 N.D. 164, 161
N.W., 732 (1917) (construction of a spur track in front of abutting landowner to the street
was i burden or servitude on the abutting landowner, and as owner of the fee the abutting
landowner was entitled to compensation for depreciation in value of his lot).
12. Hamby v. City of Dawson Springs 126 Ky. 451, 104 S.W. 259 (1907);
Town of Kinghurst v. International Lumber Co., 174 Minn. 305, 219 N.W. 172 (1928)
(abutting landowner to a highway enjoined a logging train from- crossing road, as 3ncom-
patible with travel on the highway); Rich v. Minneapolis, 37 Minn. 423, 35 N.W.2d 1012
(1947) (owner entitled to recovery the value of rock, where the city removed rock from
the street not necessary to grade or improve thr steeet).
13. Simpson v. Adkins, 386 Ill. 64, 53 N.E.2d 979 (1944).
14. Coyne v. John Gibbons Coal Co., 314 Pa. 502, 172 AtI. 653 (1934); Breish
v. Locust Mountain Coal Co., 267 Pa. 546, 110 AtI. 242 (1920 (where removal of coal
would result in breaking the surface of the highway, removal is a nuisance).
15. Town of Glencoe v. Reed, 93 Minn. 518, 101 N.W. 956 (1904).
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to set up drilling equipment, these cases seem ample to allow mineral explora-
tion underneath highways.
A. ROGER KRINGLIE
MINES AND MINERALS - SERVITUDES - ENJOINING USE OF UNDERGROUND
PASSAGES FOR TRANSPORTATION OF COAL MINED IN ADJOINING TRACTS.
A corporate defendant, under authority of a lease granted by the fee-simple
owner of coal situated beneath a 16 acre tract of land had, after virtual
exhaustion of the coal therein, abandoned further mining but continued to
use the passageways created by such mining operations for the transportation
of coal mined beneath adjacent tracts. The joint owners of the surface of the
16 acre tract sought to enjoin further use of the passageways beneath their
land. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in affirming the trial
court's dismissal of the complaint, held, when the corporate defendant leased
the coal in the 16 acre tract from the fee-simple owner thereof, under the
provision of a lease giving it that authority, it had the right to transport
through the subterranean passageways coal mined from adjoining lands so
long as the coal underlying the 16 acre tract was not exhausted or abandoned
and the mining operations were conducted with due diligence. Fisher v. West
Virginia Coal and Transport Company, 73 S.E.2d 633 (W. Va. 1952).
Because the decision is definitive of the law governing the subterranean
mining of coal alone it has little present or apparent value as an aid to inter-
pretation of North Dakota law. It is interesting, however, to note the case as
illustrative of the sanctity which jurists sometimes accord to much-cited or
"leading" cases without adequate assurance of identity in fact situations or
sufficient inquiry to the validity of the reasoning which shaped the prior
decision.
Almost the entire body of law which has developed in delineation of this
issue is traceable to the Lillibridge case,1 decided in 1891 by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania. That decision held, under facts similar to those of
the instant case, that the mine operator could not be restrained from using
the subterranean passages to transport coal from the adjoining tracts even
though the coal in the adjoining tracts was acquired subsequent to the acqui-
sition of the coal beneath the surface of the land owner by the complainants.-
It should be noted, however, that in the Lillibridge case the mine operator
was using passageways cut through the seam of coal which was the subject
of his grant, and the court there did nothing more than apply the familiar
rule that the owner may use property in any manner he chooses so long as
he does not injure another a The West Virginia Court in the instant case, like
the great majority of courts which cite the Lillibridge case as authority, failed
to distinguish this fact and preserved the right of the grantee of coal to use
the passageways for the removal of coal from adjoining tracts even though
mining operations have been suspended save for a "few pillars" 4 used for
subjacent support. In this way the grantee might extend his rights in the
1. Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 143 Pa. 293, 22 Ati. 1035 (1891).
2. Cf. Westerman v. Pennsylvania Salt Mfg. Co., 260 Pa. 140, 103 Atl. 539 (1918).
3. Robinson v. Wheeling Steel and Iron Co., 99 W.Va. 435, 129 S.E. 311, 312
(1925).
4. Armstrong v. Maryland Coal Co., 67 W.Va. 589, 69 S.E. 195, 203 (1910).
